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Abstract Through an analysis of recent case law, this article seeks to
highlight the flaws in the current English law approach to the doctrine
of vicarious liability. Focusing on the new ‘close connection’ test for
determining the ‘course of employment’ requirement, it argues that the
recent expansion of employer’s no-fault liability for the acts of employ-
ees has been founded upon a set of principles that are not only theoret-
ically unsound, but also unjustifiable by reference to the normative
background of the doctrine of vicarious liability. The article further ar-
gues that the judicial reasoning used in these cases indicates funda-
mental confusion about the nature of the distinction between direct and
vicarious liability, and a particular lack of understanding about the con-
cept of the non-delegable duty.
1. Introduction
As a result of a number of key decisions in recent years, there has
been a dramatic expansion of the ambit and scope of an employer’s
no-fault liability for torts committed by employees. More specifically,
these decisions have set out a new and broader approach to determin-
ing when an employee’s tort has been committed during the ‘course
of employment’. Following Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd,1 Dubai Aluminium
Co Ltd v Salaam,2 Mattis v Pollock3 and Majrowski v Guy’s and St
Thomas’s NHS Trust,4 the traditional ‘Salmond’ test has now been
categorically abandoned by the English courts and replaced with a
policy-driven analysis that is loosely founded on a theory of enterprise
risk, and ostensibly guided by general notions of justice and fairness.
While the movement away from the rigid semanticism that has long
been associated with the use of the ‘Salmond’ formula is to be wel-
comed, serious concerns are nevertheless to be expressed at what
* Lecturer, University of Birmingham; e-mail c.mcivor@bham.ac.uk. I wish to thank
Harvey Teff, Jenny Steele and Keith Stanton for valuble comments that they made
on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to the AHRC for funding the
period of leave during which this research was carried out.
1 [2001] UKHL 22.
2 [2002] UKHL 48.
3 [2003] EWCA Civ 887.
4 [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [2006] UKHL 34.
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can only be described as the sheer amorphousness of the new re-
placement ‘test’. For not only does it lack a sound theoretical foun-
dation, it is also worryingly bereft of any effective control
mechanisms, so that, as the primary judicial tool for determining
when it is appropriate to impose vicarious liability, it is much too
vague and unpredictable. The courts appear to have lost sight of the
fact that, as a form of no-fault liability, the doctrine of vicarious lia-
bility occupies a highly exceptional position within English tort law,
and that its existence is justified by reference to specific distributive
justice considerations. They have extended the remit of the doctrine
without taking proper account of its normative background, and in
doing so they have effected changes to it that are simply unjustifi-
able in terms of either policy or principle.
A further criticism to be levelled at these recent developments is
that they would also appear to be a product of judicial confusion
about the nature of the distinction between direct and vicarious lia-
bility. While the courts have long struggled with the application of
the distinction to corporate bodies and public authorities which, by
their nature, function solely through the activities of their employ-
ees, the problem in the present context relates specifically to a lack
of understanding about the concept of the non-delegable duty.
While liability arising from a breach of a non-delegable duty is tech-
nically a form of direct liability, it acts like vicarious liability in so
far as it is operates on a no-fault basis. The notion of the non-
delegable duty is most commonly used in the employment context,
to impose no-fault liability on an employer for the acts of an inde-
pendent contractor as regards the execution of certain important
tasks. These tasks will relate to the performance of selected core
functions that are properly seen to be the responsibility of the em-
ployer. The primary function of the non-delegable duty is thus to
ensure that employers remain responsible for these key tasks, even
in circumstances where they have chosen to delegate the actual per-
formance of the tasks to someone else. In practice, the notion of the
non-delegable duty is also used to overcome problems associated
with the operation of the employee/independent contractor distinc-
tion for vicarious liability purposes. For example, it may be used to
thwart an employer who tries to rely on a legal technicality to clas-
sify a worker as an independent contractor, so as to avoid incurring
automatic liability for any tort committed by that worker during the
course of employment. Thus, even if the worker is an independent
contractor, if the tort relates to the performance of a non-delegable
duty, then liability will still be imposed on the employer on a no-
fault basis. While in the past the concept of the non-delegable duty
has thus been employed to extend the range of workers included
within the doctrine of vicarious liability, the recent developments
would indicate that the courts are now using it to extend the range
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of conduct that is covered. It is argued that that is an entirely in-
appropriate, and indeed illegitimate, extension of its function.
The English tort system cannot easily sustain such a broad re-
gime of no-fault liability. It is thus necessary to rein in the current
expansion of the principles of vicarious liability, and to reinstate the
doctrine within the confines of a limited and exceptional remit. This
will involve a clarification of the specific distributive justice consid-
erations that underlie it and a restatement of the ‘course of employ-
ment’ requirement that is more normatively consistent with this
theoretical rationale.
II. The Recent Judicial Expansion of the ‘Course of
Employment’ Requirement
In English law, the first significant recent development in the con-
text of the ‘course of employment’ requirement of vicarious liability
may be traced to the House of Lords decision in Lister v Hesley Hall
Ltd. The claimants in this case, while residents of a school boarding
house between 1979 and 1982, had been sexually abused by the
warden who was in control of the day-to-day running of the house.
The establishment was owned and managed by the defendants as a
private commercial enterprise. In their capacity as the employers of
the warden, they were sued by the claimants in respect of the harm
inflicted by him on two separate grounds: (1) that they were negli-
gent in their care, selection and control of the warden; and (2) that
they were vicariously liable for his torts.
At first instance, the claim in negligence against the employers
was dismissed for lack of fault. They did not know that the warden
was abusing the boys, and there was no evidence to suggest that
they had exercised anything other than reasonable care in hiring
the warden and then in conferring upon him the various responsi-
bilities associated with that position. The dismissal of this action
was not subsequently challenged on appeal.
As regards the vicarious liability argument, the trial judge held
that the employers were not liable for the intentional torts commit-
ted by the warden against the boys as, on the basis of existing au-
thority,5 these were outside the course of his employment. The trial
judge did, however, hold that they were vicariously liable on an al-
ternative ground for the warden’s failure to report to them his in-
tention to commit acts of abuse and the harmful consequences to
the claimants of those acts. On appeal, the Court of Appeal dis-
missed that judgment against the defendants, declaring that ‘if
wrongful conduct is outside the course of employment, a failure to
prevent or report that wrong conduct cannot be within the scope of
employment so as to make the employer vicariously liable for that
5 Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council [1999] LGR 584.
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failure when the employer is not vicariously liable for the wrongful
conduct itself’.
The claimants were, however, ultimately successful before the
House of Lords. While agreeing with the Court of Appeal that vi-
carious liability could not be established in relation to the warden’s
failure to report his wicked intentions, a unanimous House of Lords
(Lords Steyn, Clyde, Hutton, Hobhouse and Millett) held that the in-
tentional torts committed by the warden against the claimants could
be regarded as falling within the course of his employment, so that
vicarious liability arose on this straightforward basis. Clearly deter-
mined to provide the claimants with some form of redress, and rec-
ognizing that in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal it was
the application of the traditional ‘Salmond’ test for determining
course of employment that had represented the main obstacle to im-
posing liability on the defendant enterprise, their Lordships simply
crafted a new test that was capable of covering the warden’s inde-
pendent and deliberate wrongdoing. In coming up with the new
test, their Lordships were heavily influenced by two other decisions
on the issue of vicarious liability for sexual abuse that had just re-
cently been delivered by the Canadian Supreme Court: Bazley v
Curry6 and Jacobi v Griffiths.7
i. The Traditional Salmond Test
The ‘Salmond’ formulation,8 which, prior to Lister, had prevailed as
the applicable test for ‘course of employment for nearly a century,
provides that an employee’s act will take place during the course of
his employment’ if: (a) it has been authorized by the employer;9 or
(b) it can be regarded as a wrongful and unauthorized mode of
doing some act authorised by the employer. Criticised by Atiyah as
being ‘an apparently simple test whose simplicity is largely decep-
tive’,10 its main problem was its perceived exclusivity. For although
it had clearly been formulated with only negligent or careless acts
on the part of the employee in mind, and, as such, was not de-
signed to cover intentional torts, it was, nevertheless, always treated
as the sole test for determining the ‘course of employment’ ques-
tion. Thus the courts even purported to apply it to cases involving
intentional torts. Given the kind of deliberate and wilful misconduct
that tends to form the basis of the intentional torts, the conclusion
usually reached in these instances was that the employee’s act fell
6 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45.
7 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71.
8 So-called because it is based on a passage from Salmond on Torts, 1st edn (Stevens
and Haynes: London, 1907) 83, 84.
9 In fact, this is not a true example of vicarious liability at all. It is now widely
recognized that an employer who authorizes the commission of a tort will instead
be directly liable for the relevant conduct of the employee.
10 P. S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (Butterworths: London, 1967)
172.
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outside the course of employment. And although the courts did oc-
casionally designate some form of intentional wrongdoing as an un-
authorized mode of doing an authorized act, so as to engage the
mechanisms of vicarious liability, this was only achieved by apply-
ing the formula in a rather strained and artificial manner.11 Thus in
Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co,12 the House of Lords held a firm of so-
licitors vicariously liable for the dishonesty of its managing clerk
who persuaded a client to transfer property to him and then dis-
posed of it to his own advantage. Their decision was based on the
ground that the employee was acting within the apparent scope of
his authority from his employers in dealing with the property. In
this respect, it was considered crucial that the client had been spe-
cifically invited by the firm to deal with its managing clerk. Also, in
Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd,13 an employer was held liable for
an employee’s theft of a mink stole that had been bailed to the em-
ployer for cleaning purposes. The Court of Appeal held that, having
been placed in charge of the fur while it was being cleaned, the
manner in which the employee conducted himself in that work was
to convert it, so that ‘[w]hat he was doing, albeit dishonestly, he
was doing in the scope or course of his employment in the technical
sense of that infelicitous but time-honoured phrase’.14 As Giliker
comments, it remains unresolved how such actions could be said to
be an unauthorized means of performing a particular duty, for such
actions could easily be said to negate the task the employee has
been authorized to undertake.15
Difficult to reconcile with the above decisions is the Court of Ap-
peal’s decision in Trotman v North Yorkshire Council.16 In this case, a
deputy headmaster of a special school sexually assaulted a mentally
handicapped pupil while on a school trip to Spain. His actions were
said not to fall within the course of his employment, even though
part of this particular teacher’s task of caring for the pupil involved
sharing a bedroom with him. According to Butler-Sloss LJ, even
though he had clearly taken advantage of the opportunity created
by the care arrangements to carry out the sexual assaults, his con-
duct was still ‘far removed from an unauthorized mode of carrying
out a teacher’s duties on behalf of his employer’. On the contrary,
she regarded it as ‘a negation of the duty of the council to look after
children for whom it was responsible’.17
In Lister, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal were
bound by the Trotman decision. The House of Lords, however, had
11 Described by Atiyah, above n. 10, as the use of ‘verbal sleight of hand’.
12 [1912] AC 716.
13 [1966] QB 716.
14 Ibid. at 737, per Diplock LJ.
15 P. Giliker, ‘Rough Justice in an Unjust World’ (2002) 65 MLR 269 at 271.
16 [1999] LGR 584.
17 Ibid. at 591.
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no hesitation in deciding to overrule it. The principal criticism that
the House of Lords levelled at the approach adopted by the Court of
Appeal in Trotman was that, in adhering so rigidly to the precise
language of the Salmond test, it had proceeded on the basis of a
‘rather restricted and technical view of the dispute’,18 and thus
failed to focus on what the House of Lords considered to be the
most important factor; namely, the overriding duty of the employer
to exercise reasonable care over the children on the trip, and its
delegation of this duty to the deputy headmaster.19
The House of Lords realized that one of the main defects of the
traditional test was that it required a very specific and formulaic in-
quiry into the acts that the employee was employed to do, and the
particular acts that he was engaged in when the torts were com-
mitted. But as pointed out by Atiyah, ‘this is not a question which
permits of a simple and scientific answer, because “acts” can be
described—and accurately described—at varying levels of particu-
larity’.20 Thus, the answer to the crucial legal question of whether
the employee’s tort was committed during the course of employ-
ment can vary depending on the nature of the description given to
the job that he or she was actually employed to do. It is possible to
describe a particular task using language that is inherently incom-
patible with the phrase ‘unauthorized mode of performing an au-
thorized task’. By way of example, and using the facts of Trotman, if
the ‘authorised task’ of the deputy headmaster is described, as it
indeed was by Butler-Sloss LJ in the Court of Appeal, as that of
‘caring for a handicapped teenager while on a foreign holiday’,21
then the actual carrying out of a sexual assault on the boy is of
course going to seem far removed from being an unauthorized
mode of performing this task. The notions of ‘caring’ and ‘abusing’
are simply irreconcilable. If, however, the professionally conferred
duties of the headmaster in the circumstances are cast in more spe-
cific terms, and can be said to include the responsibility of sharing a
room with the boy at night, it becomes easier to construe the con-
duct as an unauthorized mode of carrying out this task. Such soph-
istry is clearly not a defensible feature of the Salmond test.
In order to come up with a rational method of applying the
‘course of employment’ requirement to the intentional torts, it is
necessary to consider the specific purpose that this requirement is
said to serve within the vicarious liability inquiry. Fortunately the
House of Lords in Lister did exactly that, and the solution that they
18 [2001] UKHL 22 at para. 21.
19 Ibid. at para. 25.
20 Above n. 10 at 181, as noted by Lord Steyn in Lister, above n. 18 at para. 23.
21 [1999] LGR at 591.
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came up with represents a clear improvement in the law in this re-
spect.22 The primary function of the ‘course of employment’ require-
ment is to ensure that the employee’s tort is sufficiently linked to the
employer’s enterprise, so as to justify the imposition of liability on
the employer. It thus limits the responsibility of the employer to acts
committed by the employee qua employee, and excludes those re-
lated to personal or private life. In this vein, the new test formulated
by the House of Lords provides that an act will be deemed to have
been committed during the ‘course of employment’23 if there is a
‘close connection’ between the conduct and the employment. In de-
termining such issues, the courts are to be guided by the ‘justice’
and ‘fairness’ of imposing liability on the employer in the circum-
stances. As will be seen, it is this extremely vague ‘policy’ aspect of
the test that gives serious cause for concern.
ii. The ‘Close Connection’ Test
In formulating the ‘close connection’ test in Lister, the House of
Lords attempted to emulate the approach adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Bazley v Curry. The defendant in this case was a
‘not-for-profit’ organization which operated two residential care fa-
cilities for emotionally troubled children, and it was sued on a vicar-
ious liability basis in respect of the actions of an employee in
sexually abusing a resident of one of the homes. A very special fea-
ture of the regime of care implemented in these homes was that it
involved ‘total intervention’ in all aspects of the lives of the children
cared for, with employees effectively acting as substitute parents
and being expected to do everything that a parent would do, ‘from
general supervision, to intimate duties like bathing and tucking in at
bedtime’. This state of affairs proved to be central to the finding of
liability in this case.
Giving the main judgment of the court, McLachlin J began by
stating that, in the absence of any clear precedent on the issue, it
was necessary to turn to policy for guidance. This involved looking
at the purposes that vicarious liability serves and asking whether
the imposition of liability in the case at hand would serve those pur-
poses.24 Examining the apparent policy considerations underlying
the doctrine, she then concluded that it was justified essentially by
the principles of fair and efficient compensation and deterrence.
22 As Peter Cane would indeed agree: ‘Vicarious Liability for Sexual Abuse’ (2000) 116
LQR 21.
23 Lord Clyde in Lister expressed a preference for use of the phrase ‘scope of
employment’ over that of ‘course of employment’, at least ‘[i]n so far as the liability
on employer arises through the scope of the authority which the employer has
expressly or impliedly delegated to the employee’ (above n. 18 at para. 36). As will
be seen below pp. 288–96, such reasoning may be seen to indicate a
misunderstanding of the law on non-delegable duties.
24 See (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 at para. 14.
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This is where concern may initially be expressed, for as justifica-
tions for the imposition of onerous no-fault liability, such notions
come across as being worryingly nebulous. Unfortunately, this ini-
tial disconcertion at the vagueness of these so-called ‘principles’ is
only heightened by further reference to the actual reasoning em-
ployed by McLachlin J in this respect, for it is so abstract and hazy
as to be devoid of any useful meaning. Her concept of ‘fair and effi-
cient compensation’ is arguably premised upon a very loose combi-
nation of basic risk theory and a ‘deep pockets’ rationale25 that
takes no account of the realities of the circumstances actually in
play. In particular, she assesses the concept of ‘fairness’ solely from
the perspective of the victim and in terms of the victim’s need for a
remedy, when arguably it relates more to the position of the defen-
dant and the question of whether there are good reasons in the cir-
cumstances for making him take legal responsibility for harm that
he has not personally caused. As regards the notion of deterrence,
her reasoning that the imposition of vicarious liability will encour-
age employers to engage in ‘imaginative and efficient administration
and supervision’ to reduce the risk of further harm comes across as
rather naïve and simplistic.26 Essentially, she applies a standard en-
terprise risk argument to a ‘not-for-profit’ organization providing a
quasi-public service, without making any allowances for the special
status of the defendant in this respect.27 As such, her argument is
severely compromised, for as will be seen in the following section, it
illustrates her lack of understanding about the actual theoretical
foundation of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Although the House of Lords in Lister adopted the basic ‘close
connection’ test set out in Bazley, they expressly refused to endorse
the economic efficiency rationale used by McLachlin J.28 This would
have been to their credit, given the above criticism about the nature of
25 She states that: ‘[e]ffective compensation must also be fair, in the sense that it must
seem just to place liability for the wrong on the employer. Vicarious liability is
arguably fair in this sense. The employer puts in the community an enterprise
which carries with it certain risks. When those risks materialize and cause injury to
a member of the public despite the employer’s reasonable efforts, it is fair that the
person or organization that creates the enterprise and hence the risk should bear
the loss. This accords with the notion that it is right and just that the person who
creates a risk should bear the loss when the risk ripens into harm. While the
fairness of this proposition is capable of standing alone, it is buttressed by the fact
that the employer is often in the best position to spread the losses through
mechanisms like insurance and higher prices, thus minimizing the dislocative effect
of the tort within society’ (ibid. at para. 31).
26 Ibid. at para. 33.
27 She emphatically rejects the argument that an exception regarding the imposition
of vicarious liability ought to be made in relation to non-profit-making
organizations: ‘The suggestion that the victim must remain remediless for the
greater good smacks of crass and unsubstantiated utilitarianism’ (ibid. at para. 54).
In responding to this statement in Jacobi v Griffiths, Binnie J identifies very
succinctly the deeper issues with which she fails to engage: see (1999) 174 DLR
(4th) 71 at para. 76.
28 See, in particular, Lord Hobhouse’s speech: [2001] UKHL 22 at para. 60.
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the economic arguments employed, had their rejection been based on
a considered assessment of the pertinence of these particular argu-
ments in the circumstances. Surprisingly, however, their lordships29
simply declined to consider the theoretical basis of the doctrine of
vicarious liability at all. So while they were advocating the use of the
Canadian ‘close connection’ test, and indeed directing that the Bazley
decision be used as a starting-point for the consideration of such
issues in the future,30 they nevertheless dismissed the theoretical rea-
soning that formed the basis of the test and offered nothing in its
place. As Giliker comments, this makes it difficult to see how future
courts could meaningfully refer to McLachlin J’s guidelines at all,
given that they can only really be understood within the context of
their underlying economic rationale.31
Looking at the manner in which their lordships applied the ‘close
connection’ test in Lister itself, it becomes clear that they were in
favour of a much broader policy-based approach than that set out by
the Canadian Supreme Court. Rather than looking back to the original
normative justifications for the existence of the doctrine of vicarious
liability, they preferred to look forward, as it were, and to focus more
on its perceived objectives. In this respect, they appeared to conclude
that vicarious liability was based essentially on the idea that a person
who employs another for his own ends inevitably creates a risk that
the employee will commit a legal wrong and that employers ought
accordingly to be liable for the creation of such a risk. The main
function of vicarious liability was thus to provide compensation to
those vulnerable persons who, through no fault of their own, were
exposed to the inherent risks of the employer’s business. In the words
of Lord Millet: ‘[E]xperience shows that in the case of boarding
schools, prisons, nursing homes, old people’s homes, geriatric wards,
and other residential homes for the young or vulnerable, there is an
inherent risk that indecent assaults on the residents will be committed
by those placed in authority over them, particularly if they are in close
proximity to them and occupying a position of trust’.32
In setting up the residential care homes, the defendant in Lister had
thus created a risk that its homes would become the setting for sexual
abuse of children. By accepting the claimant as a resident in one of its
homes, it had moreover undertaken a responsibility for his care and
welfare. The fact that it had entrusted this responsibility to the war-
den, that it had placed him in a special position of authority so as to
enable him to discharge this responsibility effectively, and that it was
in carrying out this particular responsibility that the warden had
29 Lord Millett did make some attempt to look at the policy behind the doctrine, but
his examination of the relevant literature was cursory and he concluded that it was
best understood as a loss-distribution device: ibid. at para. 65.
30 Ibid. at para. 27.
31 Above n. 15 at 274.
32 [2001] UKHL 22 at para. 83.
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abused the claimant, all combined to establish the necessary ‘close
connection’ between the conduct and the employment. As the in-
nocent victim, the claimant was entitled to receive compensation and
in the circumstances it was appropriate to impose on the defendant
the obligation to provide this remedy.
Although the form of risk theory that was applied by the House of
Lords in Lister was clearly much wider and more generalized than the
economic rationale set out by McLachlin J in Bazley, it is undoubtedly
the case that the same outcome would have been reached under both.
For the facts of Lister were arguably so exceptional as to satisfy even
the more stringent Canadian approach—the warden did after all have
sole responsibility for most aspects of the residents’ general care and
acted almost as a parent figure.33 Thus, while the particular method
used by the House of Lords to impose liability may have been ques-
tionable, the end result achieved may be regarded as relatively uncon-
tentious. Rather it is argued that the problem lies in the signals that
the decision would appear to send out to future litigants about the
extent of non-fault liability for an employee’s intentional wrongdoing.
In using very loose risk-based reasoning, and failing to qualify it at all
in terms of the special factors pertaining to the case, their lordships
would appear to have produced an inordinately broad ratio that is
susceptible to inappropriate manipulation. As Giliker points out, it is
not the mere existence of some form of risk creation that is the key,
but rather the level of the risk that is inherent in the employment.34
Moreover, it would have been very easy in the circumstances to
have emphasized the relevance of the degree of the risk, for this could
have been achieved by merely contrasting the decision in Bazley with
that of its companion case, Jacobi v Griffiths. In Jacobi, a majority of
the Canadian Supreme Court refused to impose vicarious liability on a
‘not-for-profit’ organization operating a children’s club in respect of
acts of sexual abuse committed against two children by an employee
of the club. By contrast with the establishment in Bazley, the club
provided merely a recreational facility for children. The perpetrator of
the abuse had been employed only to supervise volunteer staff and to
organize recreational activities and the occasional outing. Crucially,
although he had been encouraged to form friendships and a positive
rapport with the children, he had not been employed to act as a
substitute parent or to interact with them in an intimate manner.35 In
short, the defendant’s enterprise did not create a significant risk of
33 As pointed out by Lord Steyn, the residential homes were intended to be a home
for the boys and not just an extension of the school environment: ibid. at para. 4.
34 Above n. 15 at 278.
35 Per Binnie J: ‘I do not want to be taken as suggesting that the creation of a parent-
type relationship constitutes a precondition to vicarious liability in child abuse
cases. However, not only do the “parental” cases have a particular relevance to the
facts of this appeal, they show how high the courts have set the bar before
imposing no-fault liability’ ((1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71 at para. 64).
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abuse and could not therefore be said to have significantly contrib-
uted to the occurrence of the victims’ harm. The link between the
harm and the employment was simply too remote.36
It is argued that in failing to make the point that the ‘close connec-
tion’ test would generally only be satisfied where the employment
created a high degree of risk of the harm occurring, the House of
Lords were courting trouble. Unfortunately, these misgivings about
the decision would appear to be all too readily confirmed by an analy-
sis of subsequent case law.
iii. Post-Lister Applications of the ‘Close Connection’ Test
In English law, the ‘close connection’ test has since been directly
applied in the following cases: Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam,37
Mattis v Pollock,38 and Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS
Trust.39 It will be seen that, as a direct result of the vagueness of the
guidance provided in Lister, each of these decisions brings the law on
vicarious liability into further disarray.
Dubai Aluminium concerned the vicarious liability of a firm of solic-
itors for the dishonest acts of one of its partners. The partner in
question had acted as the solicitor for a third party and, through his
drafting of certain documents, had knowingly assisted this client to
defraud Dubai Aluminium out of almost $45 million. This solicitor did
not, however, benefit personally from the fraud, and it was moreover
accepted that his co-partners were entirely innocent of any wrong-
doing. In settlement of a claim brought against the firm in respect of
the offending partner’s equitable wrong of dishonest participation in
a breach of trust, the firm paid out $10 million to Dubai Aluminium.
The firm then sought a contribution, under the provisions of the Civil
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, from the main third-party perpe-
trator of the fraud. Under the Partnership Act 1890, s. 10, however,
this claim for contribution depended on the firm’s being able to show
that it was legally responsible for the wrongful acts committed by the
partner. Paradoxically, therefore, this was a scenario where it was
actually in the defendant’s interest to be held vicariously liable for the
acts of the partner. That the highly exceptional nature of the claim in
this respect was central to the outcome of this case is thus an important
factor to be borne in mind when it comes to interpreting its ratio.
In applying the ‘close connection’ test to the circumstances of this
case in order to determine the ‘course of employment’ requirement,
the House of Lords unfortunately failed to elaborate much further on
the ‘guidance’ that they had set out in Lister, apart from to emphasize
the importance of considering the ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ of imposing
vicarious liability on the defendant. The claim in Dubai was very
36 See also EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate [2005] 3 SCR 45.
37 [2002] UKHL 48.
38 [2003] EWCA Civ 887.
39 [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [2006] UKHL 34.
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straightforward in this respect. The firm had not engaged in any
wrongful conduct, and to have dismissed the claim would have al-
lowed the third-party fraudsters to have remained in possession of
considerable sums of misappropriated moneys. Recognizing that the
firm was vicariously liable for the acts of the partner thus enabled it to
engage the contribution provisions and to ensure that the real wrong-
doers in the situation ultimately had to shoulder the burden of com-
pensating Dubai Aluminium.
The situation in Dubai was, however, unique. Outside of such a
scenario, it is submitted that the application of the notions of ‘justice’
and ‘fairness’ will not be so clear cut. The House of Lords in this case,
in line with the position that they had adopted in Lister, did not place
these concepts within the context of the economic rationale applied
by McLachlin J and, consequently, it is argued that all that they really
ended up doing was making the ‘close connection’ test even more
elusive. For ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ are wholly subjective concepts that
are only capable of taking on any real meaning when applied against
the backdrop of an articulated set of core values. Taken abstractly,
they provide no guidance to future courts and will certainly not help
to make the law on vicarious liability more certain or predictable.
No better example of the unhelpfulness of the bare notions of jus-
tice and fairness is provided than that of the Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion in Mattis v Pollock.40 This case revolved around the actions of a
nightclub doorman in stabbing and seriously injuring a customer of
the club. The doorman in question had been involved in an altercation
with some friends of the victim and was subsequently forced to flee
from the club to the safety of his nearby flat. Humiliated by what had
happened, the doorman later armed himself with a knife and returned
to the vicinity of the nightclub in search of revenge. Identifying the
victim as part of the relevant group, he then attacked him with the knife
and severed his spinal cord, thereby rendering him paraplegic. The
doorman was subsequently convicted at the Crown Court of causing
grievous bodily harm and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
Rather than suing his actual attacker, presumably for reasons of
impecuniosity, the victim brought an action against the owner of the
nightclub, arguing vicarious liability on the grounds that the attack
had been carried out by the doorman during the course of his em-
ployment, and also ordinary direct liability for breach of a personally-
owed duty of care. As regards vicarious liability, the Court of Appeal
explicitly incorporated the notions of ‘justice’ and fairness’ into the
‘close connection’ test, Judge LJ setting out that the broad issue for
the Appeal Court to determine was whether the assault was so closely
connected with what the defendant authorized or expected of the
doorman in his employment at the nightclub, that it would be fair and
40 For an insightful commentary on this decision, see R. Weekes, ‘Vicarious Liability
for Violent Employees’ [2004] CLJ 53.
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just to conclude that he was vicariously liable for the harm inflicted
upon the victim.41 In deciding that it was fair and just in the circum-
stances to impose vicarious liability, the Appeal Court appeared to
have been primarily influenced by evidence of fault on the part of the
defendant nightclub owner. It seems that the defendant had actively
encouraged the doorman to perform his duties in an aggressive and
intimidatory manner. Indeed, the Appeal Court was made aware of
two previous occasions on which, to the knowledge of the defendant,
the doorman had acted violently towards customers. It seems that
some of his fellow employees were so concerned about his aggressive
behaviour that they even reported him to the defendant. Damningly
for him, however, their testimony indicated that, far from taking their
concerns seriously, the defendant actually approved of the doorman’s
behaviour and was happy that he could rely on him to intimidate
customers and thereby keep order.42 On top of all this, it also emerged
that, contrary to the regulations then in force, the doorman had not
been registered with the relevant licensing authority, and that the
defendant had acted unlawfully in knowingly employing him as such.
That evidence of fault is not an appropriate justificatory basis for
the imposition of no-fault liability hardly needs to be stated. More-
over, the message that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mattis actually
sends out is that it is not even necessary to refer to legal notions of
fault in these cases, for in future judges will be expected to determine
vicarious liability issues by simply applying their own value judg-
ments to the facts of each individual claim. The truth of the matter is
that the Court of Appeal was confused about the distinction between
direct and vicarious liability in this case.43 From the emphasis that the
members of the Court of Appeal placed on the acts of encouragement
given to the doorman by the defendant club owner, it is clear that
their conclusions were heavily based on notions of authorization. And
although the first limb of the old Salmond test refers to authorized
wrongdoing and thereby implies that it gives rise to vicarious liability,
it has long been recognized that it relates instead to a form of direct
liability based on the personal responsibility of the defendant.44 If
authorization did indeed lie at the heart of the Mattis decision, then it
is argued that the Court of Appeal should have expressly addressed
the issue of whether the defendant’s encouragement of the generally
aggressive behaviour of the doorman was strong enough to be taken
as extending also to the latter’s premeditated actions in stabbing the
victim pursuant to a private vendetta. It is submitted that, on the night
41 [2003] EWCA Civ 887 at para. 19.
42 Ibid. at para. 9.
43 That the members of the Court of Appeal were prepared to conclude that the facts
of the case also supported a finding of direct liability, without engaging in any real
discussion of the apparent grounds for the direct liability argument, is further
proof of their elision of the distinction between direct and vicarious liability.
44 As recognized by Lord Millett in Lister, above n. 18 at para. 67.
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in question, the lapse of time between the scuffle in the club involving
the doorman and the victim’s friends, and the doorman’s return to the
general vicinity of the club in the early hours of the morning in search
of the group, would certainly constitute a significant obstacle to the
reaching of such a conclusion.
And finally, the most recent application of the ‘close connection’
test is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Majrowski v
Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust.45 This case unfortunately provides a
stark illustration of just how far the courts have lost their way on this
matter. The claimant in this case alleged that while working as a
clinical audit coordinator for the defendant NHS Trust (hereafter ‘the
Trust’), he was bullied, harassed and intimidated by his departmental
manager. Arguing that this amounted to harassment in breach of the
Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s. 1, he brought a claim for dam-
ages against the Trust under the 1997 Act, s. 3, on the grounds that it
was vicariously liable for the conduct of the departmental manager.
The key issue for the Court of Appeal to decide was whether the
doctrine of vicarious liability applied to breaches of statutory duty,
and more specifically, to a breach of the 1997 Act. Upholding the
claim, the Appeal Court set out that, as a general rule, employers
could be vicariously liable for breach of a statutory duty, unless the
statute in question excluded such liability. In the absence of any ex-
press exclusion, it remained to be considered whether there were any
policy reasons for reading such an exclusion into the statute. As re-
gards the 1997 Act, a majority46 held that vicarious liability was not so
excluded. More significantly, however, in relation to the ‘course of
employment’ requirement, a new slant was added to the ‘close con-
nection’ test. Auld LJ, giving the main judgment of the Court of Ap-
peal and relying on recent jurisprudence, notably the decisions of the
House of Lords in Lister and Dubai Aluminium and dicta from the
Privy Council decision in Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica,47 set
out that the new and broader approach was to assess whether the
employee’s unlawful conduct was so closely connected with the na-
ture and circumstances of his employment, and/or whether the risk of
the breach was one so reasonably incidental to it, that it would be fair
and just to hold the employer vicariously liable. Immediately, it can be
seen that a whole new limb has been added to the test and that now,
as an alternative to establishing the necessary ‘close connection’, it
will suffice to show that the employee’s wrongdoing represented a
risk that was ‘reasonably incidental’ to the nature of the employment.
Far from being an established sufficient condition of liability as
suggested by Auld LJ, the notion of ‘reasonably incidental risk’ has
only ever featured previously in highly context-specific obiter dicta,
45 See further, C. McIvor, ‘Reinventing the doctrine of vicarious liability – again!’
(2005) 21 PN 283.
46 Auld and May LJJ, Scott-Baker LJ dissenting.
47 [2005] IRLR 398
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and has certainly never been portrayed as a principle of general appli-
cability. In Dubai, Lord Millett merely uses the idea of the employee’s
wrongdoing being a risk that is reasonably incidental to the employ-
er’s business to justify the application of the vicarious liability doctrine
to equitable wrongdoings as well as to the established liabilities aris-
ing at common law and by statute. By contrast, in Majrowski, Auld LJ
makes the ‘reasonably incidental risk’ idea an integral part of the test
for determining whether vicarious liability will arise on the facts of an
individual case, which is a completely different and much more con-
troversial matter.
In Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica, Lord Steyn’s references
to the ‘reasonably incidental risk’ notion are similarly qualified by
context. The claimant in this case was shot and then arrested by a
police officer in Kingston, Jamaica, as he tried to make an inter-
national call from a public telephone. The officer had demanded use of
the phone, and when the claimant refused to comply, an altercation
ensued, during which the officer pulled out his service revolver and
fired at the claimant’s head. While the claimant was recovering in
hospital from his injuries, the officer placed him under arrest for
allegedly assaulting a police officer and handcuffed him to the bed.
Criminal charges were then brought against the claimant, although
these were later withdrawn.
The claimant brought actions for assault, false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution against the police officer and sought to hold the
Crown, as his employer, vicariously liable for his conduct. Applying
the principles set out by the House of Lords in Lister, the Privy Council
(Lords Bingham, Steyn, Millett, Scott and Carswell) set out that the
correct approach to determining whether an employer is vicariously
liable for an employee’s intentional torts is to concentrate on the
relative closeness of the connection between the nature of employ-
ment and the particular tort, and to ask whether, looking at the matter
in the round, it is just and reasonable to hold the employer vicariously
liable. In this respect, the evidence of the constable’s announcement
that he was a police officer prior to shooting the claimant, and the fact
that he had later arrested him for allegedly interfering with the execu-
tion of his duties as a police officer were held to be of crucial im-
portance. Giving the main judgment of the Board, Lord Steyn also
stated that it was necessary to take into account the relevance of the
risk created by the fact that the police authorities routinely permitted
police officers to take loaded service revolvers home, and to carry
them while off duty.48 However, he made it clear that this factor on its
own was not capable of making the police authority vicariously liable.
The dominant feature of the case, and the main reason why vicarious
liability was imposed, was the fact that the offending officer had, at all
material times, purported to act as a police officer. The risk created by
48 Ibid. at para. 27.
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the carrying of the gun was merely an additional factor lending
weight to the overall vicarious liability argument.49
In presenting the ‘reasonably incidental risk’ notion as a stand-
alone test for determining vicarious liability, the Court of Appeal in
Majrowski may be seen to apply a very loose version of risk theory as
the normative foundation of the doctrine. The Court of Appeal refers
to very general notions of loss distribution and promotes deterrence
and compensation as the primary objectives of the vicarious liability
regime. Against this backdrop, the overarching guiding principles of
‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ will be satisfied whenever an innocent victim
receives compensation from the creator of the risk of harm. From the
facts of Majrowski, it would further appear that the risk of harm in the
circumstances does not have to be particularly strong. The Trust was
said to have created the risk of harassment by simply placing the
departmental manager in a position of authority over the claimant. By
this reasoning, all employers who operate a hierarchial staffing sys-
tem will be vulnerable to such liability.
Unfortunately, a valuable opportunity to rectify this situation was
then missed when, on appeal to the House of Lords, the Trust chose to
contest only the finding of the Court of Appeal that the doctrine of
vicarious liability applied to breaches of the Protection from Harass-
ment Act 1997.50 In dismissing the appeal, the House of Lords there-
fore did not even have to make reference to the application of the
‘close connection’ test.
Majrowski demonstrates the dangers of the broad policy-based ap-
proach to determining questions of vicarious liability. The courts need
clearer guidance than that provided by the vague and unqualified
principles of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’. In order to formulate such guid-
ance, it is necessary to have a clear idea about the normative founda-
tion of the doctrine and its specific purpose. For, contrary to the
impression given by both the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal,
vicarious liability is not just a simple mechanism for distributing
losses and providing compensation. It is founded rather on very pre-
cise distributive justice theory, the details of which it is important to
understand.
49 See [2005] IRLR 398 para. 28. Useful reference may also be made here to the Privy
Council decision in Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] 1
WLR 1273. In this case, a probationary police officer was said not to have been
acting in the course of his employment when, in a fit of jealous rage at finding his
girlfriend in a bar with another man, he used a police service revolver to shoot and
injure the claimant. He was not acting as a police officer at the time, but had
instead abandoned his post and embarked on a vendetta of his own. See also
Brown v Robinson [2004] UKPC 56, in which the actions of a security guard in
shooting a gatecrasher were said to fall within the course of his employment, for
the simple reason that he had been ostensibly acting in his capacity as a security
guard throughout the entire incident. His conduct thus amounted to an
unauthorized mode of performing his duty to preserve order.
50 [2006] UKHL 34.
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III. The Normative Foundation of the Doctrine of
Vicarious Liability
As pointed out by Atiyah, the reason why the existence of the doctrine
of vicarious liability needs to be specifically justified is that the very
idea of holding one person liable, on a no-fault basis, for the acts of
another runs counter to two fundamental principles of English tort
law: namely that people should only be liable for harm caused by their
own acts or omissions, and that people should only be liable where
they have been at fault.51 The justifications for the doctrine of vicari-
ous liability have, however, changed over time. In 1916, Baty famously
identified nine different grounds that had, at one time or the other,
been put forward in support of the doctrine.52 Of these, the most
important were the arguments that the employer had control of the
activities of his employees, that he benefited from their labours and
that he was generally in a better financial position than his employees
to meet the cost of claims.
Writing in 1967, Atiyah acknowledged the continued significance of
the majority of the traditional justifications that had been analysed by
Baty, but concluded that the principle of loss distribution had become
the most rational modern explanation for the existence of the doc-
trine.53 On this view, the doctrinal basis of vicarious liability was said
to lie in the basic moral idea that someone who obtains a benefit from
an act should also have to bear the risk of loss from that act. This
reasoning, combined with the notion that the employer will have con-
tributed to the risk of the harm by deciding to operate the enterprise
the question and by choosing to employ the tortfeasor, would then be
used to validate the initial targeting of the employer. However, ulti-
mately, it was the knowledge that he would be able to distribute the
cost of harm in an economically efficient and expedient manner that
would have persuaded us to accept this particular form of no-fault
liability as both a necessary and appropriate tool for the promotion of
overall justice. In short, at this time, the doctrine of vicarious liability
was thought to be justified essentially by the combination of a basic
enterprise risk notion and a loss distribution argument, with the latter
constituting the weightier of the two.
The notions of economic efficiency and expedience are central to
the justificatory nature of the loss distribution principle in this con-
text. Contrary to the impression that has arguably been created by the
emphasis placed in Bazley, Lister and Majrowski on the bare notions
of compensation and deterrence, the principle is not to be understood
in the looser sense of referring to a simple ‘deep pockets’ argument.
That employers are generally in a better financial position than their
51 Above n. 10 at 12.
52 T. Baty, Vicarious Liability. A Short History of the Liability of Employers, Principals,
Partners, Associations and Trade Unions etc. (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1916).
53 Above n. 10, at 27.
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employees, and thus represent the surest compensation source for
victims is not, of itself, a strong enough reason for making them
subject to a regime of no-fault liability. It is rather their ability to pay
taken in conjunction with the fact that they will then be able to spread
the loss by passing the costs of the claims on to consumers through
small increases in the price of their products or services that makes
the imposition of vicarious liability seem just and fair in the circum-
stances. As pointed out by Atiyah, since most employers are corpora-
tions rather than individuals, then even where they are unable to pass
the costs on through higher prices, perhaps because the market com-
petition is too strong, they will still be able to engage in a considerable
degree of loss spreading by distributing losses amongst ‘those who, in
a commercial sense, constitute the enterprise itself, i.e., the share-
holders and staff and employees of the enterprise. Shareholders may
receive a slightly lower dividend and employees may receive a smaller
wage increase’.54
There is also a further economic argument to the effect that enter-
prises need to bear the costs of the harm caused by their operations in
order to ensure efficiency in the allocation of national resources. Cal-
abresi, for instance, asserts that costs of harm must be recognized as
part of the overall costs of the business and thus taken into account in
determining the true costs of the enterprise.55 The theory is that as the
costs of the enterprise rise, action will be taken to reduce costs by
increasing efficiency. Therefore, it is only through knowledge of the
true costs of the enterprise that optimum efficiency can be achieved
and the forces of market competition thus be properly engaged.
Applied strictly, this ‘enterprise risk combined with efficient loss
distribution’ explanation of vicarious liability only really provided a
strong justification for the imposition of vicarious liability against ‘for-
profit’ organizations. ‘Not-for-profit’ organizations, such as charities,
voluntary groups or public authorities in the context of their provision
of various public services, do not exist for the primary purpose of
obtaining personal benefits, so that the moral argument that those
who take advantage of others to pursue their own gains should have
to bear the losses associated with the third-party conduct does not
hold very much initial sway. Nor can such organizations undertake
the kind of convenient and efficient loss distribution described by
Atiyah. As recognized by Binnie J, in delivering the majority decision
in Jacobi v Griffiths, the ‘not-for-profit’ employer ‘does not operate in
a market environment and has little or no ability to absorb the cost of
such no-fault liability by raising prices to consumers in the usual way
54 Above n. 10, at 23.
55 G. Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1960) 70
Yale LJ 499. This theory is discussed by Atiyah with a certain degree of cynicism:
above n. 10 at 25.
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to spread the true cost of “doing business”. It has no efficient mecha-
nism to “internalize” the cost’.56
At the time when Atiyah was writing, however, there was a rela-
tively clear and settled distinction between services provided by ‘for-
profit’ organizations and those provided by ‘not-for-profit’ ones, with
only the former being routinely subjected to the principles of vicari-
ous liability. Since then, the distinction between the public and private
sector has become very blurred. For example, many public services
have undergone varying degrees of privatization, and there is now a
great deal of overlap between the range of services provided by ‘for-
profit’ and ‘not-for-profit’ concerns. This means that ‘not-for-profit’
employers are now just as likely as their ‘for-profit’ counterparts to be
targeted by a vicarious liability claim. From the point of view of vic-
tims of harm caused by a ‘not-for-profit’ enterprise, it would be clearly
inequitable to deprive them of compensation on the sole ground that
the defendant employer in question would be unable to spread his
losses with the same degree of convenience and efficiency as an ordi-
nary ‘for-profit’ employer. In short, there is an expectation today that
all employers be treated alike in this context.
In order to meet these changes in the structure of modern society,
the theoretical justifications for the doctrine of vicarious liability have
had to be modified. This has meant a movement away from the loss
distribution principle and towards the enterprise risk argument as the
primary explanatory factor. There has thus been a basic shift in the
balance of the traditional justifications. This is very clearly evidenced
in the recent case law, most notably in Lister and Majrowski, with
great emphasis now being placed on the idea that the defendant em-
ployer has created the relevant risk of harm in the first place.
On this basis it is at least possible to understand why there has
been greater use of basic risk theory in vicarious liability cases, and
even to accept that this has been both necessary and appropriate in
terms of justifying the continued existence of the doctrine within our
current tort system. Nevertheless, it is contended the courts are cur-
rently applying the enterprise risk argument to vicarious liability
claims in a manner that is both inappropriate and disproportionate.
For although the enterprise risk argument may have overtaken the
loss distribution principle in terms of relative importance as a justifi-
cation for vicarious liability, this does not mean that it has become the
sole explanation for its continued existence and that the loss distribu-
tion principle had become entirely irrelevant. They still come together
to justify the doctrine, and it is merely the nature of their interrelation-
ship that has changed.
Not only are the courts currently failing to accord adequate sig-
nificance to the notion of efficient loss distribution in determining
vicarious liability issues, they are relying on too broad a concept of
56 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71 at para. 71.
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enterprise risk. In the context of the recent developments in the law in
relation to the ‘course of employment’ requirement, the relative weak-
ness of the loss distribution principle as a justification for the applica-
tion of vicarious liability principles to ‘not-for-profit’ organizations
must be regarded as an important consideration precisely because it
is these very organizations that are likely to be most affected by the
resultant expansion of the doctrine. For example, although the actual
defendant in Lister was a private commercial enterprise, the majority
of organizations dealing with the care of children will be run by public
authorities. More importantly, the ‘assumption of responsibility’ type
of reasoning that can be seen to underlie the recent vicarious liability
decisions, to the effect that the defendant employer has held himself
out as taking on responsibility for the care of vulnerable persons and
thus induced a concomitant reliance on this role being properly exe-
cuted, is most readily applicable to publicly provided services, for
example those relating to education and medical care. Echoing the
sentiments of Binnie J in Jacobi, while it is recognized that the basic
application of vicarious liability principles to such organizations can
be justified on other grounds, it is argued that the lack of weight of the
loss distribution justification in this respect ought however to make
the courts think twice about extending the no-fault liability of ‘not-for-
profit’ enterprises.57 Following the guidance of the European Court of
Human Rights on the application of policy considerations to questions
of liability, it is argued that the courts need to adopt a more balanced
approach in this respect and to weigh up the policy arguments both
for and against the imposition of liability.58 As such, it cannot be
ignored that one of the likely consequences of the dramatic expansion
of the no-fault liability of charitable and voluntary institutions is that
they will simply decide to discontinue certain services. A concern lest
such a fate would befall recreational facilities such as those provided
by the children’s club at the centre of the claim in Jacobi certainly
played a significant role in the formation of the majority decision not
to impose vicarious liability in that instance.
As regards the use of risk theory as the primary justification for
the imposition of vicarious liability in a given scenario, it is has al-
ready been argued that the focus of attention should be on the level
of risk that has been created by the defendant enterprise, and that
vicarious liability ought only to be contemplated in cases where there
is a high degree of the relevant harm inherent in the nature of the
employment. As the decision in Majrowski shows, if the courts con-
tinue to rely alone on the basic notion of risk creation, then it will be
difficult to impose any kind of limit on the operation of the doctrine
of vicarious liability.
57 Ibid.
58 Osman v UK [1999] 1 FLR 193.
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It must be remembered that vicarious liability is a truly exceptional
form of liability. It imposes liability on a no-fault basis. It is for this
reason that it requires very strong justifications. To the extent that the
recent developments in the law on vicarious liability have been founded
upon weak or inappropriate policy considerations, it is argued that
they ought to be repudiated. If the doctrine is to retain any kind of
legitimate position in the English tort system, its remit must in future be
confined within the boundaries set by a strictly construed theory of
enterprise risk and economic loss distribution. This may well involve a
detailed analysis of the applicability of such a theory in each individual
scenario in which it is sought to impose vicarious liability.
Unfortunately, the adoption of such a disciplined approach will not
alone solve all of the problems currently associated with the law on
vicarious liability. For there is a further conceptual problem with the
doctrine that would appear to afflict the English courts. It is one that
relates to the nature of the distinction between direct and vicarious
liability, and in particular, the concept of the non-delegable duty.
IV. Judicial Confusion Between Direct and
Vicarious Liability
In the specific context of the recent extensions of the principles of
vicarious liability, judicial misunderstandings surrounding the nature
of the distinction between direct and vicarious liability stem from a
failure to differentiate between ordinary fault-based direct liability
and the exceptional form of no-fault direct liability that is based on
breach of a non-delegable duty. For it is the latter that the courts have
been conflating with vicarious liability principles.
i. The Distinction Between Vicarious Liability and Ordinary
Direct Liability
Vicarious liability is a form of secondary liability which arises only
upon proof of the prior primary liability of another party. That is to
say that the vicarious liability of the employer is dependent upon
evidence of the commission of a tort by the employee, and for which
the employee could be personally sued. Vicarious liability operates on
a no-fault basis, and is predicated entirely upon the status of the
defendant as an employer and his consequent relationship with the
employee tortfeasor. No inquiry will be made into the conduct of the
defendant employer, and so the fact that he may have behaved
throughout in an exemplary manner will not relieve him of legal re-
sponsibility. Direct liability, by contrast, relates rather to ordinary
personal responsibility for conduct, and may be conveniently de-
scribed as liability for personal fault. The employer will be directly
liable for breach of a duty owed personally to the claimant. Thus,
while for vicarious liability purposes the main focus is on the conduct
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of the employee, in direct liability claims it is instead on the conduct of
the defendant employer.
Given that legal entities, as opposed to natural persons, can only
ever act through their employees, the concept of direct liability on
their part takes on a specific meaning, and one that would appear to
overlap significantly with the notion of vicarious liability. In essence,
the potential for direct liability will exist if there is a direct duty owed
on the part of the defendant. Direct duties do not form the basis of
many claims. As a general rule, vicarious liability will also be arguable
in such circumstances, and that tends to be the route that claimants
pursue.59 Where the defendant is a legal entity being sued in respect
of harm inflicted by an employee, it can also be very difficult to iden-
tify the exact nature and scope of any direct duties that may have been
owed in the circumstances. They are generally very broad duties that
relate to the overall safety of business operations. For instance, it has
long been established that all employers owe, to the own employees, a
direct duty at common law to provide competent staff, adequate plant
and material, a safe place of work and a safe system of working.60 As
regards direct duties owed to non-employees, there are again a small
number of very broad common law obligations imposed on any natu-
ral person or legal entity providing a service to the public. The most
common example is the duty to hire competent employees to deliver
the service. Since direct liability is a form of fault-based liability, it
follows that such direct duties are not absolute. Rather they are only
duties to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances, and so em-
ployers can avoid liability for breach of a direct duty by demonstrat-
ing that they were not at fault.
It is necessary, however, to consider separately the position of hos-
pitals in this respect. This is because hospitals (both private and NHS-
run) have historically been subject to a number of special direct
duties. Such duties extend beyond the provision of competent staff
and adequate facilities and equipment, to cover the provision of ade-
quate communications systems between staff,61 and adequate systems
for summoning appropriate members of medical staff to deal with
specific types of emergencies.62 These duties are owed to patients and
arise as soon as the patients either present themselves for treatment
or are admitted for treatment.63
To establish breach of such a direct duty, it will generally be neces-
sary to show that there has been some kind of organizational or
administrative failure on the part of the hospital. The fault inquiry will
59 See comment to this effect made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in X v Bedfordshire
County Council [1995] 3 All ER 353 at 392.
60 See, e.g., General Cleaning Contractors Ltd v Christmas [1953] AC 180 and Latimer
v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643.
61 Robertson v Nottingham HA [1997] 8 Med LR 1.
62 Bull v Devon AHA [1993] 4 Med LR 117.
63 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington HMC [1969] 1 QB 428.
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thus usually focus on the hospital’s relevant systems and procedures.
As explained by Grubb, these direct duties are concerned with the
fault of the organization, rather than the negligence of an individual
member of staff.64
ii. Direct Liability Based Upon Breach of a Non-delegable Duty
A non-delegable duty is a direct duty, responsibility for which cannot
be delegated to another. That is to say that if the defendant chooses to
delegate performance of the duty to someone else, any failure by that
person to carry it out properly will be said to constitute a direct
breach of duty by the defendant. As such, non-delegable duties are
absolute duties, as opposed to duties of reasonable care. They give
rise to an obligation on the defendant to ensure that reasonable care is
taken. A delegate’s failure to exercise reasonable care will thus, of
itself, represent a breach of the defendant’s duty and no further in-
quiry into fault will need to be made. As such, the breach of a non-
delegable duty will give rise to a form of no-fault liability on the part
of the defendant. By contrast to the doctrine of vicarious liability,
therefore, it is the direct relationship between the defendant and the
claimant that establishes the duty in this context, and then the conduct
of the delegated employee that is used to establish its breach. There is
no need to show that the conduct of the delegate amounts to an actual
tort, and no ‘course of employment’ requirement applies.
The non-delegable duty is a mechanism for imposing liability for the
acts of independent contractors. A limited number of non-delegable
duties exist at common law and under statute.65 Landowners, for exam-
ple, are subject to a non-delegable duty to provide support for adjoin-
ing land, and those carrying out work on the highway are said to be
under a non-delegable duty in respect of the performance of opera-
tions that may cause a danger to the public.66 By far the broadest and
most common forms of such duties, however, relate to the obligations
on employers to ensure the safety of their employees.67 Thus in
McDermid v Nash Dredging and Reclamation Co Ltd,68 the defendant
64 A. Grubb, Principles of Medical Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2004) 513.
65 In Alcock v Wraith (1991) 59 Build LR 16, Neill LJ listed seven categories of non-
delegable duties: (1) absolute duties imposed by statute; (2) duties of support to
neighbouring land; (3) duties in relation to escapes of fire; (4) duties arising under
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher; (5) duties in relation to work carried out on the
highway; (6) duties in respect of certain extra-hazardous activities; and (7) the
duties of employers regarding the safety of employees. It is worth noting that
although statutory duties are necessarily non-delegable on the basis that it is not
possible to sub-contract out a responsibility that has been imposed by Parliament,
this principle does not apply to mere statutory powers: Rivers v Cutting [1982] 3 All
ER 69.
66 On the Canadian position in this respect, see Lewis v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR
1145.
67 Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co v English [1938] AC 57. See also Kondis v State
Transport Authority (1984) 58 ALJR 531.
68 [1987] AC 906.
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employer was held liable for injuries sustained by one of its employees
through the negligence of an independent contractor, on the basis that
this negligence amounted to a breach of the defendant’s non-delegable
duty to provide and operate a safe system of work. Basically, the con-
cept of the non-delegable duty is thus used to promote the efficient
performance of certain important tasks by ensuring that the party in
the best position to achieve that outcome is unable to foist this respon-
sibility onto anyone else. Where the employer is not therefore in a
position to control the working environment effectively, for example
where an employee is sent to work overseas for a significant period of
time, the duty to provide a safe system of work will cease to exist.69
In the past, the concept of the non-delegable duty has often been
used as a mechanism for the imposition of de facto vicarious liability
for the acts of independent contractors.70 This has been due to dis-
satisfaction with the operation of the pivotal vicarious liability distinc-
tion between employees and independent contractors. In short, the
technical differences that are drawn between the concepts of the ‘con-
tract of service’ and the ‘contract for services’ are not thought always
to explain or justify adequately the dramatically different legal conse-
quences that flow from the attribution of each of these labels. The
concept of the non-delegable duty thus constitutes an effective tool for
circumventing the exclusion of the ordinary vicarious liability princi-
ples to independent contractors, for in giving rise to a form of no-fault
liability, it provides the courts with an alternative legal basis on which
to achieve exactly the same outcome.
Clear evidence of this particular judicial tactic is to be found in the
hospital context. It may be traced first of all to dicta of Lord Greene
MR in Gold v Essex County Council.71 He reasoned in terms of a non-
delegable duty in order to impose liability on a hospital in respect of
the negligence of a radiographer. In his view, the hospital had as-
sumed a responsibility to treat the patient. This created the duty which
was then breached by the negligent treatment that had been pro-
vided. In terms of understanding the true motivation behind this ap-
proach, it is necessary to have regard to the specific timing of the
decision. For Gold was decided during the Hillyer era, when it was
thought that hospitals could not be held vicariously liable for the
negligence of their medical staff. This rule stemmed from Hillyer v
Governors of St Bartholomews Hospital,72 in which the Court of Ap-
peal had taken the view that the doctrine of vicarious liability covered
only the performance of ‘ministerial or administrative duties’. The
prevailing view at that time was that an individual only constituted an
employee for vicarious liability purposes if the institution had control
69 Square D Ltd v Cook [1992] IRLR 34.
70 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see E. McKendrick, ‘Vicarious Liability
and Independent Contractors—A Re-Examination’ (1990) 53 MLR 770.
71 [1942] 2 KB 293.
72 [1909] 2 KB 820.
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over the performance of that person’s duties. Since the work done by
doctors and nurses involved the exercise of special professional skills,
they were said to be more akin to independent contractors. Of course,
it is important to note that Hillyer occurred prior to the creation of the
National Health Service, at a time when hospitals operated primarily
as charitable institutions, and benefited from a so-called ‘charitable
immunity’, whereby they were given a significant degree of protection
from legal liability.73 Coming thirty years after Hillyer, the decision in
Gold to impose liability for the negligence of a radiographer repre-
sented a major turning point in the law relating to hospitals. More
importantly, Lord Greene MR’s application of the non-delegable duty
can be revealed as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the vicarious
liability distinction between employees and independent contractors,
and is an early reflection of judicial dissatisfaction with the manner in
which it operated.
In the subsequent cases of Cassidy v Ministry of Health74 and Roe v
Ministry of Health,75 the Hillyer rule was categorically abandoned on
the grounds of its incompatibility with the modern structure of health
provision. Moreover, in both decisions, Denning LJ also invoked the
notion of the hospital’s non-delegable duty. In addition to an assump-
tion of responsibility argument, he also made reference to the fact that
it is the hospital authority, and not the patient, that selects the medical
staff who will dispense treatment. As this selection task forms part of
the hospital’s overall duty to treat the patient with reasonable care, any
failure on the part of individual doctors and nurses to provide proper
care will necessarily constitute a breach of duty in this respect.
In Gold, Cassidy and Roe, however, the majority decisions all ulti-
mately rested on vicarious liability grounds. Indeed, it was not until
1998 that the concept of the non-delegable duty actually featured in
the ratio of a hospital liability decision. In M v Calderdale and Kirklees
Heath Authority,76 the claimant was referred by her NHS doctor to a
private clinic for an abortion.77 The procedure was negligently per-
formed and the abortion failed. Imposing liability on the defendant
health authority, the trial judge held that, as soon as it accepted the
claimant into its care, the NHS owed her a non-delegable duty to bring
about the effective provision of services, either by providing this itself
or causing others to effect this on its behalf. The claimant was moreover
entitled to expect an effective termination of her pregnancy from any
person in whose hands she was placed by her NHS doctor. By failing to
73 See further, P. Osgode, ‘The Modern Hospital and Responsibility for Negligence—
Pointing the Canadian Courts in the Right Direction’ (1993) 22 Anglo-Am LR 289.
74 [1951] 2 KB 343.
75 [1954] 2 QB 66.
76 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med 157.
77 The claimant did not pursue an action against the private hospital because it
turned out to be insolvent and uninsured.
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provide the effective abortion, the NHS had thus breached its duty and
was directly liable for the claimant’s resultant harm.
Once again it can be seen that the concept of the non-delegable
duty was used for the specific purpose of imposing no-fault liability
for the acts of an independent contractor, in circumstances where it is
thought that the vicarious liability distinction between employees and
independent contractors operates in an arbitrary manner, and that
the defendant’s relationship with the independent contractor is very
similar to that with his employees. It thus constitutes a back-door
route to securing an extension of the principles of vicarious liability to
independent contractors. Moreover, such a conclusion is supported
by a recent Court of Appeal decision on the scope of M v Calderdale.
In A (A Child) v Ministry of Defence,78 the wife of a British Army
soldier serving in Germany gave birth to a premature baby at a Ger-
man hospital. As a result of the obstetrician’s negligence, the child
suffered brain damage. The care at the hospital had been arranged by
an English NHS trust, which in turn had been contracted to do so by
the Ministry of Defence.79 In an action against the MoD, the case
advanced on behalf of the child was that the negligence of the Ger-
man obstetrician constituted a breach of a non-delegable duty of care
owed to the child by the MoD. It was alleged that the duty in question
was to ensure the provision of obstetric treatment that would be
delivered with reasonable care and skill. The Court of Appeal refused
to recognize the existence of such a duty on the part of the MoD.
Giving the main judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lord Phillips MR
reasoned that the although there were exceptional circumstances in
which a defendant might be fixed with a non-delegable personal duty
to exercise reasonable care capable of making him liable for the negli-
gent acts of an independent contractor, such duties arose only where
the claimant could be shown to have suffered an injury while in an
environment over which the defendant had control. In the case at
hand, the link between the MoD and the German obstetrician was
simply too remote. Its sole role had been to arrange for medical treat-
ment for British service personnel and their dependants in Germany
to be provided by others. Tellingly, it was suggested that such a duty
would have arisen if the MoD had actually been running its own
military hospitals in Germany.80
The labelling of the obstetrician as an independent contractor in the
circumstances was regarded as entirely appropriate by the Court of
Appeal. Hence it did not feel the need to apply the non-delegable duty
argument. In addition, Lord Phillips MR was clearly persuaded by the
fact that the claimant would be able to obtain compensation from the
78 [2004] EWCA Civ 641.
79 Instead of running its own military hospitals, the MoD had contracted with the
trust for it to arrange for designated German hospital providers to provide
secondary health care for servicemen and their dependants in German hospitals.
80 Above n. 78 at para. 63.
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German hospital through the German courts. Indeed, he appeared to
be somewhat critical of the family’s decision to bring proceedings
against the MoD in England for the sole reason that this was a more
convenient route to compensation for them.81 In his eyes, the correct
route was clearly to sue the hospital directly under German law.
Although Lord Phillips MR distinguished Calderdale in this case, he
also appeared to be somewhat critical of it, for he commented that it did
not actually represent the state of English law as it existed at that time,
having been based merely on obiter dicta.82 This is significant, because
it indicates that the notion of the non-delegable duty still occupies a
somewhat precarious position in English law. It is certainly a highly
exceptional duty with a very limited remit.83 Arguably its main purpose
to date has been to overcome the limitations of the vicarious liability
distinction between employees and independent contractors. As such,
it is submitted that, as suggested by McKendrick, a better solution to
this problem would be to address the definition of the independent
contractor for vicarious liability purposes.84
iii. The Non-delegable Duty Rationale Underlying the Recent
Developments of the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability
While the previous findings of breach of a non-delegable duty have
been artificial in the sense of amounting to backdoor routes to vicari-
ous liability, outwardly at least, they have been properly presented as
giving rise to a form of direct liability. More recently, however, not
only has the non-delegable duty been put to wholly improper uses, it
has been dressed up as a vicarious liability concept.85 For it was a
distinct non-delegable duty rationale that was used in Lister to justify
its dramatic expansion of the nature and scope of employee miscon-
duct covered by the doctrine of vicarious liability, and it was this
81 Ibid. at paras. 55–6.
82 Ibid. at para. 52.
83 By contrast, in Australian tort law, the notion of the non-delegable duty has been
much more widely accepted. Indeed, it is used to impose no-fault liability on
schools in respect of negligently inflicted harm to pupils. See The Commonwealth v
Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. The High Court of Australia has, however, recently
declined to extend its remit to cover harm that has been inflicted intentionally, as
opposed to just negligently: New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4. In a series of
recent cases, the Canadian Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that
child welfare authorities owe to the children in their care a non-delegable duty to
ensure that they are not abused by foster carers: EDG v Hammer [2003] 2 SCR 459;
KLB v British Columbia [2003] 2 SCR 403; and MB v British Columbia [2003] 2 SCR
477.
84 Above n. 70. Significantly, the recent decisions in Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v
Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151 and Hawley v Luminar
Leisure plc [2006] EWCA Civ 30 would appear to indicate that the courts are at
least now prepared to address this problem more openly and that a solution is
perhaps to be found in the use of a simple ‘control’ test to determine what
constitutes an employment relationship for the purposes of a vicarious liability
claim.
85 For a Canadian example of a similarly flawed approach, see Boothman v Canada
[1993] 3 FC 381.
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decision which then formed the direct basis for the subsequent exten-
sions effected in Dubai Aluminium, Mattis v Pollock and Majrowski.
In Lister, Lord Hobhouse referred to a ‘general proposition that,
where the defendant has assumed a relationship to the plaintiff which
carries with it a specific duty towards the plaintiff, the defendant is
vicariously liable in tort if his servant, to whom performance of that
duty has been entrusted, breaches that duty’.86 Indeed in Majrowski,
Auld LJ expressly interpreted Lord Hobhouse’s speech in Lister as
having been based on the notion of delegation or entrustment,
‘namely that an employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful act of
his employee where he has “entrusted” a duty to an employee who, by
his wrongful act, has failed to perform it’.87
Lord Clyde based his decision in Lister on the idea that, ‘the care
and safekeeping of the boys had been entrusted to the respondents
and they in turn had entrusted their care and safekeeping, so far as
the running of the boarding house was concerned, to the warden’.88
Finally, Lord Millett imposed no-fault liability on the basis that ‘[t]he
school was responsible for the care and welfare of the boys. It en-
trusted that responsibility to the warden. He was employed to dis-
charge the school’s responsibility to the boys. For this purpose, the
school entrusted them to his care. He did not merely take advantage
of the opportunity which employment at a residential school gave
him. He abused that special position in which the school had placed
him to enable it to discharge its own responsibilities, with the result
that the assaults were committed by the very employee to whom the
school had entrusted the care of the boys’.89
To the extent that the use of the non-delegable duty rationale in this
manner is illustrative of the conceptually confused judicial reasoning
behind the recent developments of no-fault liability, it must give cause
for concern. Indeed, it would seem that the courts are actually mixing
up three distinct forms of liability: (1) ordinary fault-based direct lia-
bility; (2) exceptional no-fault based direct liability based upon breach
of a non-delegable duty; and (3) vicarious liability. For it is a basic
assumption of the responsibility argument (fault-based direct liability)
that is being dressed up in non-delegable duty rhetoric (no-fault direct
liability), ultimately to produce conclusions that are presented in vi-
carious liability terms. Thus, it is tenuous fault-based reasoning,
which on its own would not give rise to fault liability, that is being
used, via the non-delegable duty notion, to found no-fault liability. The
86 [2001] UKHL 22 at para. 56. As Giliker points out, it would also be possible to
interpret Lord Hobhouse’s speech in this respect as an attempt to resurrect the
now discredited ‘master’s tort’ theory of vicarious liability: above n. 15 at 275.
87 [2005] EWCA Civ 251 at para. 32.
88 [2001] UKHL 22 at para. 50.
89 Ibid. at para. 82.
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end product is thus a combination of fault-based direct liability princi-
ples and no-fault-based vicarious liability principles but without the
control mechanisms of either.90
V. Conclusion
Not only has the recent expansion of vicarious liability been based
upon a flawed understanding of the doctrine’s theoretical foundation,
it has been exposed as a product of judicial confusion about the na-
ture of the distinction between vicarious and direct liability. If the
courts persist with this broad policy-based approach to determining
‘course of employment’ issues, the inevitable result will be the crea-
tion of an uncontainable regime of no-fault liability. If compensation
and loss distribution are to represent the new overriding objectives of
vicarious liability, and a basic risk theory is to become the primary
tool for justifying individual findings of such liability, then there will
no longer be any reason to limit the doctrine to employers. For such
reasoning could be just as easily be applied to any risk-producing
activity that is traditionally covered by insurance, most obviously the
act of driving.
If the doctrine of vicarious liability is to maintain a legitimate posi-
tion within our corrective-justice-led tort system, its remit must be
controlled by a strictly construed theory of enterprise risk and effi-
cient loss distribution. To the extent that the recent developments of
the doctrine cannot be supported by reference to this theory, they
may be said to compromise the basic structure of English tort law. If
the courts are to persist with the current expansion of vicarious liabil-
ity, then they must recognize that they are moving the tort system in
the direction of a general regime of no-fault accident compensation.
90 On a related point, this elision of the principles of direct and vicarious liability will
also add to the considerable difficulties that are already being experienced by
institutional abuse victims in relation to the statutory limitation rules. As
established by the House of Lords in Stubbings v Webb [1993] 1 All ER 322, while
actions against employers based on breach of a direct duty are subject to an
extendable three-year limitation period, those brought on a vicarious liability basis
are caught by the non-extendable six-year rule. For a recent illustration of how this
state of affairs operates to the disadvantage of abuse victims, see the Court of Appeal
decision in A v Hoare [2006] EWCA Civ 395. For a comment on this decision, see C.
McIvor, ‘The spectre of Stubbings v Webb lives on’ (2006) 22 PN 119.
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